Legal opens with the obligation: Article 29 requires concentration risk mitigation for critical ICT third parties. They read it out. Everyone nods.
IT responds with the architecture: two providers, redundant links, automatic failover tested in Q2. Everyone nods again.
Then someone asks the actual question: does the redundant setup satisfy Article 29, or just look like it might?
Silence. Because nobody in the room can translate between the two. Legal doesn't know what "redundant" means technically. IT doesn't know what "concentration risk mitigation" requires legally. Both sides are confident. Neither can confirm the other is right.
This isn't a compliance failure. It's not even a technical gap. The system might be completely fine. The problem is that nobody in the organisation can actually verify that, because the regulatory obligation and the infrastructure spec were never mapped to each other in the first place.
Multiply this across DORA, NIS2, ISO 27001, and whatever comes next, and it's not one meeting. It's every meeting.
We build that mapping. The layer that turns "Article 29" into a specific, verifiable infrastructure requirement, and turns "redundant failover" into evidence a regulator actually recognises. It's the core of how we run our DORA Lead Manager work.